7 Proven Steps: SLSA 1.1 Implementation in CI/CD

TL;DR (for dev & engineering leaders)

SLSA 1.1 raises the bar on build integrity and provenance. This guide gives you drop-in CI steps to: 1) generate provenance for every build, 2) sign artifacts & SBOMs, 3) verify at deploy, 4) block unsigned or policy-violating releases, 5) run OpenSSF Scorecard + policy-as-code checks, and 6) publish auditable evidence that helps you pass reviews and map to NIST CSF 2.0 / 800-171—without slowing delivery.

Update: We’ve published a complete SSDF 1.1 CI/CD attestation walkthrough—SBOM, signing, provenance, and verification at deploy.
https://www.cybersrely.com/ssdf-1-1-ci-cd-attestation/

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What you’ll build

• A CI pipeline that emits a SLSA 1.1 provenance file for every build and signs images, tars, zips, SBOMs.
• A CD gate that verifies signatures/provenance before rollout.
• Policy-as-code to fail risky builds automatically.
• An evidence store (digest-addressed) with artifacts auditors can reuse.

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Step 1 — Generate SLSA provenance for every build

GitHub Actions (container image example):

name: build-and-provenance
on: [push]
jobs:
  build:
    permissions:
      id-token: write        # keyless signing
      contents: read
      packages: write
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Build image
        run: |
          IMAGE=ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.sha }}
          echo "IMAGE=$IMAGE" >> $GITHUB_ENV
          docker build -t $IMAGE .

      - name: Login to GHCR
        run: echo "${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}" | docker login ghcr.io -u $ --password-stdin

      - name: Push image
        run: docker push $IMAGE

      # --- SLSA provenance (in-toto Statement, predicate v1) ---
      - name: Create build provenance
        run: |
          cat > provenance.json <<'JSON'
          {
            "_type": "https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1",
            "subject": [{"name": "${{ env.IMAGE }}", "digest": {"sha256": "$(docker inspect $IMAGE --format='{{.Id}}' | cut -d: -f2)"}}],
            "predicateType": "https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1",
            "predicate": {
              "buildType": "https://slsa.dev/container/build",
              "builder": {"id": "github-actions"},
              "buildConfig": {"workflow": "${{ github.workflow }}", "ref": "${{ github.ref }}"},
              "metadata": {"buildInvocationID": "${{ github.run_id }}"}
            }
          }
          JSON
          mkdir -p out && mv provenance.json out/provenance-${{ github.sha }}.json

Tip: For multi-artifact repos, emit one provenance per artifact (image, binary, zip) so you can verify each by digest later.

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Step 2 — Sign artifacts, SBOMs, and provenance (keyless)

# Build SBOM (example with Syft CLI)
syft packages dir:. -o cyclonedx-json > out/sbom-${GITHUB_SHA}.json

# Cosign keyless sign: image + SBOM + provenance (OIDC via CI)
cosign sign ${IMAGE}
cosign attest --predicate out/sbom-${GITHUB_SHA}.json \
  --type cyclonedx ${IMAGE}
cosign attest --predicate out/provenance-${GITHUB_SHA}.json \
  --type slsaprovenance ${IMAGE}

GitHub Actions step (OIDC already enabled above):

- name: Install cosign
  uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3

- name: Sign & attest
  run: |
    cosign sign $IMAGE
    cosign attest --predicate out/sbom-${{ github.sha }}.json --type cyclonedx $IMAGE
    cosign attest --predicate out/provenance-${{ github.sha }}.json --type slsaprovenance $IMAGE

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Step 3 — Verify at deploy (fail closed by default)

CD verification gate (Kubernetes example):

- name: Verify image & attestations
  run: |
    set -euo pipefail
    cosign verify $IMAGE
    cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance $IMAGE | jq .
    cosign verify-attestation --type cyclonedx $IMAGE | jq .

Only roll out if verification passes:

- name: Deploy (only if verified)
  if: success()
  run: |
    kubectl set image deploy/app app=$IMAGE

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Step 4 — Block unsigned or non-compliant releases (policy gates)

Conftest/OPA Rego policy to require SLSA provenance + Scorecard min score:

package cicd

default allow = false

# Inputs: verification JSON + scorecard JSON fed via CI steps
provenance_ok {
  input.attestations[_].type == "slsaprovenance"
  input.attestations[_].verified == true
}

scorecard_ok {
  sc := input.scorecard
  sc.score >= 7        # set your bar: 0..10
  not sc.checks[_].name == "Binary-Artifacts" with sc.checks[_].pass == false
}

allow { provenance_ok; scorecard_ok }

CI step to enforce the policy:

- name: Run policy checks
  run: |
    cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance $IMAGE > out/verify.json
    scorecard --repo="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}" --format=json > out/scorecard.json
    conftest test --input json --policy policy/ out/verify.json out/scorecard.json

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Step 5 — Add OpenSSF Scorecard + “policy-as-code” in CI

Scorecard GitHub Action (fail under threshold & publish evidence):

- name: OpenSSF Scorecard
  uses: ossf/scorecard-action@v2
  with:
    results_file: out/scorecard.json
    results_format: json
- name: Enforce minimum Scorecard score
  run: |
    SCORE=$(jq '.score' out/scorecard.json)
    [ "${SCORE%.*}" -ge 7 ] || { echo "Scorecard < 7"; exit 1; }

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Step 6 — Publish auditable artifacts to an evidence store

Digest-addressed layout:

evidence/
  images/
    sha256/<digest>/
      image.txt                 # reference (registry, tag)
      cosign-bundle.json        # signature bundle
      provenance.json           # SLSA v1.1 predicate
      sbom.cdx.json             # CycloneDX SBOM
      scorecard.json
      policy-result.json
      metadata.json             # build/run ids, reviewers, ticket links

Why it helps audits: reviewers can re-verify signatures by digest, trace build → source, and match SBOM to shipped artifact. This supports NIST CSF 2.0 (governance & protection themes) and NIST SP 800-171 families (e.g., configuration management, audit & accountability, system integrity) with concrete evidence, not just policy text.

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Step 7 — Map dev controls to compliance (what auditors actually use)

Dev control (you ship)	Evidence (you store)	Helps with…*
Signed builds (keyless)	cosign bundle + verify logs	Integrity & release control (CSF Protect; 800-171 CM/AU/SI)
SLSA provenance v1.1	in-toto statement (predicate)	Build traceability (CSF Govern/Protect; 800-171 CM)
SBOM (CycloneDX)	sbom.cdx.json per digest	Component visibility (CSF Identify/Protect; 800-171 CM/RA)
Policy gates (OPA/Conftest)	policy code + CI status + logs	Preventative control (CSF Protect; 800-171 SI)
OpenSSF Scorecard ≥ threshold	scorecard.json + trend	Secure-by-default practices (CSF Govern/Protect)

*High-level alignment for audit narratives; use your specific program’s mappings during formal assessments.

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Real-time recipes (copy/paste)

GitLab CI variant:

build:
  image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:latest
  script:
    - export IMAGE=$CI_REGISTRY_IMAGE:$CI_COMMIT_SHA
    - /kaniko/executor --destination $IMAGE
    - cosign sign $IMAGE
    - syft packages dir:. -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.json
    - cosign attest --predicate sbom.json --type cyclonedx $IMAGE
    - ./scripts/gen-provenance.sh > provenance.json
    - cosign attest --predicate provenance.json --type slsaprovenance $IMAGE
  artifacts:
    paths: [sbom.json, provenance.json]
    when: always

deploy:
  stage: deploy
  script:
    - cosign verify $IMAGE
    - cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance $IMAGE
    - cosign verify-attestation --type cyclonedx $IMAGE
    - kubectl set image deploy/app app=$IMAGE

Minimal gen-provenance.sh:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
cat << JSON
{
  "_type":"https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1",
  "subject":[{"name":"$IMAGE","digest":{"sha256":"$(crane digest $IMAGE | cut -d: -f2)"}}],
  "predicateType":"https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1",
  "predicate":{
    "buildType":"https://slsa.dev/container/build",
    "builder":{"id":"gitlab-ci"},
    "buildConfig":{"pipeline":"$CI_PIPELINE_ID","project":"$CI_PROJECT_PATH"},
    "metadata":{"buildInvocationID":"$CI_JOB_ID"}
  }
}
JSON

Kubernetes admission (block unsigned by default) — example with Kyverno:

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-signed-images
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  rules:
  - name: verify-signature
    match:
      resources:
        kinds: ["Pod"]
    verifyImages:
    - imageReferences: ["ghcr.io/yourorg/*"]
      attestations:
      - type: "https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1"
      # Optionally require Scorecard passthrough via custom attestation

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Evidence your execs (and auditors) will love

• One build → one digest → one folder (everything resolvable by SHA-256).
• Deterministic: anyone can re-verify with the same commands.
• Narrative ready: link tickets/owners/PRs in metadata.json.
• Quarterly reviews: export Scorecard trends and signature coverage.

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Where to go next (related reads on Cyber Rely)

• Add an ASVS 5.0 Gate to CI/CD (turn standards into CI checks).
• Gate CI with CISA KEV JSON: Ship Safer Builds (block risky versions fast).
• AI-Generated Code Supply-Chain Risk: 7 Proven Ways (paste-ready patterns).
• 7 Proven PCI DSS 4.0.1 Remediation Patterns (audit-friendly fixes).
• Explore more on the Cyber Rely Blog.

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Try our free scanner (great for quick external checks)

Use our Free Website Vulnerability Scanner to spot common issues before release and attach a report PDF to your evidence bundle.

The homepage of our free tool displays the URL input field and the “Scan” action.

Sample report summary to check Website Vulnerability (issues found & severities).

👉 Run a scan: https://free.pentesttesting.com/

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Need help implementing this?

If you want a sprint-friendly rollout with artifact mapping to NIST CSF 2.0 / 800-171 and ready-to-verify evidence, our teams can help:

• Risk Assessment Services — get a prioritized roadmap with auditor-ready outputs. https://www.pentesttesting.com/risk-assessment-services/
• Remediation Services — we implement the fixes, wire the gates, and produce the artifacts. https://www.pentesttesting.com/remediation-services/

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