7 Proven Steps for CVE-2025-48384 Git Mitigation

TL;DR (for dev & SRE leads)

CVE-2025-48384 exposes CI/CD and developer laptops to submodule-driven arbitrary file write → code execution. Treat this as a pipeline risk first, repo risk second. This battle-tested CVE-2025-48384 Git mitigation playbook gives you 7 steps you can drop into GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, and Jenkins today—no external tooling required.

You’ll do this now:

• Stop git clone --recursive from untrusted repos
• Enforce core.hooksPath to disable repo-provided hooks in CI
• Pin to patched Git versions at runtime
• Audit .gitmodules defensively
• Alert on unexpected submodule entries in PRs
• Model submodules in your SBOM/checklist
• Isolate build agents and gate reviews for submodule changes

Quick internal reads for your team:

• Cyber Rely Blog
• Risk Assessment Services
• Remediation Services
• Free tool for quick web surface checks: Website Vulnerability Scanner online free

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The threat in plain English

CVE-2025-48384 abuses how Git parses configuration for submodules. A crafted .gitmodules can redirect checkout paths and plant or trigger hooks, culminating in arbitrary file write and RCE on Linux/macOS during clone or common subcommands. Because CI runners often perform recursive clones and run hooks, a poisoned submodule can sneak execution into your build—not just your repo.

Why CI/CD is the blast radius:

• CI runners are powerful (tokens, signing keys, artifact access)
• Runners often auto clone submodules
• Hooks can fire during routine steps (e.g., commit, merge, checkout)
• Build images may have unpatched Git

Free Website Vulnerability Scanner Webpage Screenshot

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7 Proven Steps (drop-in ready)

1) Disable recursive submodule clones from untrusted sources

Recursive clones are the common exploit path. Block them in CI and require a manual audit of .gitmodules first.

GitHub Actions guard (blocks --recursive in workflows):

name: guard-git-recursive
on: [workflow_call, pull_request]
jobs:
  block-recursive:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Detect forbidden recursive clone
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          if grep -R -- '--recursive' -n .github/workflows || \
             ( [ -n "${GIT_TRACE:-}" ] && echo "$GIT_TRACE" | grep -- '--recursive' ); then
            echo "Do not use 'git clone --recursive' from untrusted sources. Audit .gitmodules first."
            exit 1
          fi

GitLab CI:

guard-git-recursive:
  stage: test
  script:
    - set -euo pipefail
    - if grep -R -- '--recursive' -n .gitlab-ci.yml; then
        echo "Forbidden: recursive clones from untrusted sources";
        exit 1;
      fi

Jenkins (Declarative):

stage('Guard Recursive') {
  steps {
    sh '''
      set -euo pipefail
      if grep -R -- "--recursive" -n Jenkinsfile; then
        echo "Forbidden: recursive clones from untrusted sources"
        exit 1
      fi
    '''
  }
}

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2) Enforce core.hooksPath to neutralize repo-provided hooks in CI

Point hooks to an empty dir so no repository hooks can run during builds.

mkdir -p "$HOME/.git-hooks-empty"
git config --global core.hooksPath "$HOME/.git-hooks-empty"
git config --global --get core.hooksPath  # verify

Add as an early CI step (before any checkout-driven build steps). Keep normal hooks only on dev laptops—not in CI.

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3) Pin patched Git versions (fail closed)

Verify the runner’s Git at runtime; fail if it isn’t one of the patched lines or a newer fixed version.

GitHub Actions:

- name: Enforce patched Git (CVE-2025-48384)
  run: |
    set -euo pipefail
    reqs="2.43.7 2.44.4 2.45.4 2.46.4 2.47.3 2.48.2 2.49.1 2.50.1"
    v=$(git --version | awk '{print $3}')
    ok=0
    for r in $reqs; do [ "$v" = "$r" ] && ok=1; done
    # allow anything > 2.50.1
    [ "$(printf '%s\n2.50.1\n' "$v" | sort -V | tail -1)" = "$v" ] && ok=1
    if [ $ok -ne 1 ]; then
      echo "Git $v is not patched for CVE-2025-48384 Git mitigation."; exit 1
    fi

GitLab CI (before_script):

before_script:
  - |
    set -euo pipefail
    reqs="2.43.7 2.44.4 2.45.4 2.46.4 2.47.3 2.48.2 2.49.1 2.50.1"
    v=$(git --version | awk '{print $3}')
    ok=0
    for r in $reqs; do [ "$v" = "$r" ] && ok=1; done
    [ "$(printf '%s\n2.50.1\n' "$v" | sort -V | tail -1)" = "$v" ] && ok=1
    [ $ok -eq 1 ] || { echo "Unpatched Git $v"; exit 1; }

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4) Lock Git protocols at runtime

Forbid local/unsafe transports during clone to reduce attack surface:

git -c protocol.file.allow=never -c protocol.git.allow=never clone "$REPO_URL" repo

Allow only https/ssh in CI unless you explicitly whitelist otherwise.

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5) Audit .gitmodules before any init

Build a tiny defensive audit and run it before submodule operations.

scripts/audit-gitmodules.sh:

set -euo pipefail
test -f .gitmodules || exit 0

# Reject control chars, absolute paths, or traversal
if grep -P '\r$' .gitmodules || grep -E 'path\\s*=\\s*/' .gitmodules || grep -E 'path\\s*=\\s*\\.\\.' .gitmodules; then
  echo "Suspicious submodule paths detected in .gitmodules"; exit 1
fi

# Restrict to https/ssh only
if grep -E 'url\\s*=\\s*(git://|file://|http://)' .gitmodules; then
  echo "Insecure or local protocols found in .gitmodules"; exit 1
fi

echo ".gitmodules audit passed"

Pre-commit (blocks bad entries from landing):

# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
  - repo: local
    hooks:
      - id: audit-gitmodules
        name: Audit .gitmodules for unsafe entries
        entry: bash scripts/audit-gitmodules.sh
        language: system
        files: ^\.gitmodules$

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6) Detect & alert on unexpected submodule changes

Fail PRs when .gitmodules is added/changed without approval.

GitHub Actions:

- name: Alert on .gitmodules changes
  run: |
    set -euo pipefail
    if git diff --name-only origin/${{ github.base_ref }}... | grep '^.gitmodules$'; then
      echo "::error:: .gitmodules changed. Label 'submodule-review' and require codeowners";
      exit 1
    fi

CODEOWNERS example:

# Require security/infra approval for submodule changes
/.gitmodules @security-team @devops-leads

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7) Track submodules in your SBOM/checklist

Most SBOM tools won’t model submodules as packages. Emit a mini-inventory alongside your SBOM and gate on it.

Emit JSON inventory:

awk '
  $1=="[submodule" {name=$2} 
  $1=="url" {gsub(/url = /,""); print "{\\"name\\":" name ",\\"url\\":\\""$0"\\"}"} 
' .gitmodules | tr -d '[]" ' > submodules.json

Gate on unapproved hosts or new entries:

python - <<'PY'
import json, sys, re
allowed = re.compile(r'^(?:github\.com|gitlab\.com|bitbucket\.org)/your-org/')
subs = [json.loads('{'+l.strip().strip(',')+'}') for l in open('submodules.json')]
bad = [s for s in subs if not allowed.search(s['url'])]
if bad:
  print("Blocked submodules:", bad); sys.exit(1)
PY

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Detection & incident response (when you think a runner got popped)

Fast checks

# 1) What hooks executed recently?
find ~/.git -maxdepth 2 -type f -name 'post-*' -exec ls -l {} +

# 2) Suspicious files dropped during clone/build
sudo find / -mmin -30 -type f -user $(whoami) 2>/dev/null | head -200

# 3) New submodules or path anomalies in last commit range
git diff --name-only --diff-filter=A -U0 HEAD~5..HEAD | grep '^.gitmodules$' || true

Containment

• Rotate CI secrets/tokens
• Invalidate signing keys or attestations tied to the suspect build
• Reimage ephemeral runners; don’t reuse base images without patching Git
• Block submodule changes until security review clears the repo

Forensics

• Preserve build logs/artifacts
• Snapshot runner filesystem or container (read-only) for analysis
• Tie commit/PR to identity; check for prior suspicious forks or submodule churn

Sample report from the free tool to check Website Vulnerability

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Recovery & policy hardening

• Review gating: Require CODEOWNERS for .gitmodules.
• Runner isolation: Separate public fork builds from internal builds; no shared workspaces.
• Artifact trust: Use provenance/attestations; fail on missing SLSA-style attestations.
• Least privilege: Scope CI tokens to repo and environment; short TTL.
• Recurring checks: Add the audit + version checks to nightly jobs.
• Programmatic assurance: Include this CVE-2025-48384 Git mitigation checklist in your SDLC gates.

Need a structured, audit-ready approach? Start with a Risk Assessment and a fix plan through Remediation Services. For quick staging checks during triage, run our Free Website Security Scanner: free.pentesttesting.com.

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“Good citizen” engineering snippets (copy/paste)

Safe clone wrapper (CI):

safe_clone() {
  url="$1"; dest="$2"
  git -c protocol.file.allow=never -c protocol.git.allow=never clone "$url" "$dest"
  (cd "$dest" && test -f .gitmodules && bash scripts/audit-gitmodules.sh || true)
  (cd "$dest" && git config --local core.hooksPath "$HOME/.git-hooks-empty")
}

Minimal submodule initializer (non-recursive):

git submodule init
git config -f .gitmodules --get-regexp 'submodule\\..+\\.url' | awk '{print $1}' \
 | while read key; do
     url=$(git config -f .gitmodules --get "$key")
     case "$url" in
       https://*|ssh://*) : ;;
       *) echo "Blocked submodule protocol: $url"; exit 1;;
     esac
   done
git submodule update --init --depth=1

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Where this fits in your program

• SDLC gates: Add the CI guards to your “build” and “pre-merge” gates.
• Assurance evidence: Keep the passing logs of your Git version check, hooksPath enforcement, and .gitmodules audit with each release.
• Executive reporting: Track % of runners on patched Git; MTTR from detection to rotation.

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Related posts on Cyber Rely (good internal linking)

• Git CVE-2025-48384: Safe Submodules in Practice
• Gate CI with CISA KEV JSON: Ship Safer Builds
• npm supply chain attack 2025: ‘Shai-Hulud’ CI fixes

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CTA for dev leads: Paste the guards today, then share this checklist with your platform team. For quick web surface checks linked from your repos, use our free scanner.

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